研討日期	2022年10月24日 中午12:30~ 13:50
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Prisoner dilemma in a vertical duopoly with managerial delegation
作者 Authors of the paper	Stefano Colombo
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Managerial and Decision Economics Volume 43, Issue 5 p. 1476-1481
主講人	林燕淑
參加人員	林燕淑、張瑞雲、彭正浩、郭文忠、鍾嘒陵、蘇家睿、許至乙、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、Noya Yukari Siregar、Latasha Barshilia、 Manuel-Milan Ramsler
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We consider managerial delegation with two firms producing goods of different qualities. We show that both firms choose to delegate in equilibrium, but a prisoner dilemma is not inevitable in the case of Cournot competition. Indeed, when the quality asymmetry is sufficiently large, the profits of the high-quality firm are greater than in the case of no delegation.