研討日期	2022年9月19日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院606教室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Managerial delegation under capacity commitment: A tale of two sources
作者 Authors of the paper	Stefano Colomboa, Marcella Scrimitoreb
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 150, June 2018, Pages 149-161
主講人	Bui Dang Long
參加人員	王光正、高國峯、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Bui Dang Long、Noya Yukari Siregar、Latasha Barshilia
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The paper discusses the role of delegation to managers in a duopoly in which the optimal decisions upon in-house production and outsourcing may lead make and buy to coexist, namely bi-sourcing to arise at equilibrium. In the benchmark framework of quantity competition, outsourcing to an inefficient external manufacturing is shown to be strategically used under bi-sourcing with the aim to exploit market advantages induced by delegation. Strategic reasons for adopting either outsourcing or in-house production, besides leading firm's profits to increase in the cost of internal or external production, let delegation not be the optimal (unique) endogenous choice, which contrasts with previous studies. It may also cause, under sufficiently high product differentiation, a reversal of the advantage of the delegating (first-mover) firm over the non-delegating (second-mover) rival.