研討日期 |
2022年9月5日上午10:30~ 12:30 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學社會科學院606教室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
Welfare-reducing price
competition under relative performance delegation with convex costs |
作者 Authors of the paper |
Lili Xu, Toshihiro
Matsumura |
文獻出處 Journal,
vol.(issue), pp |
Journal of Economic Modelling Volume 112, July 2022,
105871 |
主講人 |
Bui Dang Long |
參加人員 |
Bui Dang Long、林燕淑、高國峯、彭正浩、黃鴻、許至乙、蘇家叡 |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
Price competition is
thought to be more intense than quantity competition in oligopolies. By
introducing strategic delegation contracts, this study challenges this
belief. We consider management reward contracts based on relative
performance, which is observed globally. We show that if marginal costs are
increasing, quantity competition yields lower prices, smaller profits, and
greater welfare than price competition. Then, we endogenize the mode of
competition and find that both price and quantity competition can exist in
equilibrium. Finally, we extend our analysis to include a mixed duopoly
wherein a state-owned public firm competes with a private firm. We determine
that the welfare-inferior outcome (price competition) appears in the unique
equilibrium. Our findings suggest that price competition does not necessarily
imply stricter competition among firms in either private or mixed
oligopolies, which is important from an antitrust perspective. They also
imply that coordination among firms regarding the mode of competition
(contract form) may be harmful to society and should be monitored by
antitrust agencies. |