研討日期	2022年8月8日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院713會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Private contracts in two-sided platforms
作者 Authors of the paper	Gastón Llanes, Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 52, No. 4, Winter 2021 pp. 815–838
主講人	Suttiwan Suwannajoi
參加人員	Suttiwan Suwannajoi、王光正、林燕淑、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、 Dong Van Chung (童文終)、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家叡、鍾暳陵、郭文忠
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study a platform that signs private contracts with sellers. Contractual secrecy implies interrelated hold-up problems for buyers and sellers that reduce platform profits and welfare. By increasing its control over sellers’ prices, the platform is able to increase price transparency and commit to not behaving opportunistically, which increases profits and welfare. Thus, policy prescriptions for dealing with contractual secrecy are reversed in the case of two-sided platforms. We also find a platform may benefit from an erosion of its market power on one side of the market because this erosion may raise the surplus it offers the other side.