研討日期	2022年7月25日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organizations
作者 Authors of the paper	ZHIQI CHEN and THOMAS W. Ross
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 1993, 2(4), 593-614
主講人	許至乙
參加人員	許至乙、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、陳彥勲、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、蘇家叡、郭文忠
摘要 Abstract of the paper	A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.