研討日期	2022年7月4日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社會科學院710會議室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive dealing when upstream displacement is possible
作者 Authors of the paper	Ke Liu and Xiaoxuan Meng
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2021; 30:830–843.
主講人	Damiana Simanjunta
參加人員	Damiana Simanjuntak、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、陳彥勲、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、郭文忠、丁虹仁
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study exclusive dealing when the incumbent may be displaced by a more efficient entrant due to the need for a firm to pay a fixed cost to remain active. We show that the incumbent can deter socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts under the one‐buyer‐one‐supplier framework. This result continues to hold in the presence of product differentiation, in which case exclusion is more likely to occur when the efficiency gap between the entrant and the incumbent falls into an intermediate range.