研討日期	2022年6月27日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學社科院710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive Dealing Competition in Asymmetric Markets
作者 Authors of the paper	Damiana Simanjutak and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Damiana Simanjutak
參加人員	Damiana Simanjutak、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家叡、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper models an ED competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival in asymmetric markets and introduce horizontal differentiation using the barbell model. We derive the following results. First, manufacturers prefer ED from a monopoly supplier over different suppliers. Second, the dominant supplier wins in the large market by offering a compensation fee a bit higher than that offered by the small rival. Third, the small rival supplier wins in the small market by offering a compensation fee that is a bit higher than the dominant supplier's offer. Lastly, the dominant supplier wins in both markets when the large market is sufficiently larger in size and the difference between consumers’ willingness to pay in the two markets is relatively low; otherwise, the small rival wins.