研討日期	2022年5月2日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學713討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of R&D Investment
作者 Authors of the paper	Dang-Long Bui and Wen-Jung Liang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Bui Dang Long
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家叡、高國峯
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper aims to examine whether exclusive dealing (ED) can arise and the effects of it on the level of R&D and welfare by introducing the R&D investment, when the products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. By referring to the New York State Attorney General’s complaint against Intel, we define the pricing policy in this paper as that the input supplier offers specific discounted input prices to help the downstream manufacturer win the competition in the downstream markets under exclusivity. We derive several interesting results as follows. First, exclusivity equilibrium arises if the transport rate is low, i.e., 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡1, while the reverse occurs if 𝑡1 < 𝑡 < 1. Second, the optimal R&D level under ED is lower than under no ED if the R&D cost parameter 𝛿 and t are low such that 𝛿 + 𝑡 < 2, while the reverse occurs if either δ or t is high such that 𝛿 + 𝑡 > 2. Third, exclusive dealing can improve social welfare if the transport rate is low and the R&D cost parameter is high.