研討日期	2022年4月18日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Timing of patent licensing and royalties
作者 Authors of the paper	Chia-Hung Sun
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	孫嘉宏
參加人員	孫嘉宏、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjuntak、蘇家叡、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This research analyzes the incentives for a firm to license a cost-reducing technology and the determinant of royalties based on a dynamic insider licensing model with continuous time. We find when the product substitutability or the innovation size is relatively low that the licensor (innovator) sets a royalty that is a little bit high but not too high to induce the licensee to accept the licensing contract and to adopt the new technology. The equilibrium outcome is sequential adoption with the licensor as the leader and the licensee as the follower in adopting the new technology. It is better for both the licensor and the licensee to accept the licensing contract, which is a win-win situation, than for no licensing to occur even in the cases of fixed-fee licensing with differentiated products and unit-royalty licensing with homogenous products. For welfare analysis, we show that a licensor sets an excessively high royalty, and that the duopoly firms are both too late for adopting the new technology.