研討日期	2022年3月21日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Vertical relations, opportunism, and welfare
作者 Authors of the paper	Germain Gaudin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 50, No. 2, Summer 2019, pp. 342–358
主講人	Dong Van Chung
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Ayu Sasni Munte、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Bui Dang Long、蘇家叡、郭文忠、丁虹仁
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers’ instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of opportunism on firms’ profits. Our results remain robust whether retailers hold passive or wary beliefs. We derive some implications for the antitrust analysis of information exchange between firms