研討日期	2021年11月22日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	1. Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market 2. Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
作者 Authors of the paper	1. Maria Alipranti, Chrysovalantou Milliou, and Emmanuel Petrakis 2. Debasmita Basak and Leonard F.S. Wang
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	1. Economics Letters 124 (2014) 122–126 2. Economics Letters 138 (2016) 53–56
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	丁虹仁、王光正、施姵全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、Damiana Simanjutak、蘇家叡、郭文忠、高國峯
摘要 Abstract of the paper	1. This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers’ surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition. 2. We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff pricing contract is determined through centralised Nash bargaining. We further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).