研討日期	2021年10月25日上午10:30~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學606 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	1. Licensing to a durable-good monopoly 2. Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation
作者 Authors of the paper	1. Changying Li and Xiaoyan Geng 2. Minggao Xue and Lili Su
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	1. Economic Modelling 25 (2008) 876–884 2. Economic Modelling 28 (2011) 1186–1194
主講人	蘇家叡
參加人員	蘇家叡、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Ayu Sasni Munte、Dong Van Chung、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、Damiana Simanjuntak、鍾暳陵、郭文忠、高國峯、丁虹仁
摘要 Abstract of the paper	1. This paper incorporates a durable-good monopoly model and re-examines the argument on licensing contracts. It shows that, from the perspective of the non-producing patent holder, the optimal licensing contract depends on the nature and the degree of the innovations. Specifically, for small cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, charging a royalty is optimal. For large cost reducing or quality-improving innovations, licensing by means of a fee and a royalty is superior to using either alone. However, for the case of horizontal product innovations, using a fee contract is optimal. 2. Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally, we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents.