研討日期 |
2021年10月18日上午10:30~ 12:30 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學606 討論室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
Frenemies in Platform Markets: Heterogeneous Profit Foci as Drivers of
Compatibility Decisions |
作者 Authors of the paper |
Ron Adner, Jianqing Chen, Feng Zhu |
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 66, No. 6, June 2020, pp. 2432–2451 |
主講人 |
Suttiwan Suwannajoi |
參加人員 |
Suttiwan Suwannajoi、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Ayu Sasni Munte、蘇家叡、鍾暳陵、郭文忠、丁虹仁 |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
We study compatibility
decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both
hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic
model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We
find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner
with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content
application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference
in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities
increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform
owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform
owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform
owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the
standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We
further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than
under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive
content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives. |