研討日期 |
2021年10月04日上午10:30~ 12:30 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學606 討論室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
External Reference Pricing under Incomplete Information |
作者 Authors of the paper |
Van-Chung Dong, Yan-Shu Lin, and Pei-Cyuan Shih |
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Working paper |
主講人 |
Van-Chung Dong |
參加人員 |
Van-Chung Dong、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、陳彥勲、Ayu Sasni Munte、Suttiwan Suwannajoi、許至乙、蘇家叡、鍾暳陵、郭文忠 |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
External reference pricing
(ERP) is common tool practiced by governments to on purpose of lowering
domestic price which the price is determined by a basket of foreign prices.
The paper aims to explore the interaction between the home government,
exporting firm and foreign retailer under a world of incomplete information.
Our key findings are that the social welfare under uninformed government and
informed manufacturer is always worse-off than one under full information.
However, the social welfare under uninformed government and uninformed manufacturer
might be better-off if the foreign market is low. Next, given uninformed
government, the social welfare under uninformed manufacturer is no worse-off
than one under informed manufacturer. For the case of uninformed government
and informed manufacturer, the pooling and the separating policy result in
the same social welfare. For the case of uninformed government and uninformed
manufacturer, the pooling policy is more desirable only if two types of
foreign market are comparatively large and the probability of high type is
low enough, otherwise the separating policy is called-for. |