研討日期	2021年9月13日上午10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710 討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Information and Two-Sided Platform Profits
作者 Authors of the paper	Andrei Hagiu, Hanna Hałaburda
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization 34 (2014) 25–35
主講人	Suwannajoi Suttiwan
參加人員	王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、郭文忠、Dong Van Chung、Beny Trias Oktora、Ayu Sasni、陳彥勲、許至乙、蘇承叡
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits—under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other side (users) to be uninformed about prices charged to developers and to hold passive expectations. We show that platforms with more market power (monopoly) prefer facing more informed users. In contrast, platforms with less market power (i.e., facing more intense competition) have the opposite preference: they derive higher profits when users are less informed. The main reason is that price information leads user expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reductions. Platforms with more market power benefit because higher responsiveness leads to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Competing platforms are affected negatively because more information intensifies price competition.