研討日期	2021年7月25日上午10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	External Reference Pricing under Incomplete Information
作者 Authors of the paper	Dong Van Chung
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	Dong Van Chung
參加人員	Dong Van Chung、陳彥勲、Damiana Simanjuntak、施姵全、黃鴻、Suttiwan 蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、Beny Trias Oktora、Bui Dang-Long、許至乙、彭正浩、丁虹仁、王羿傑、吳世傑
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Our key finding is that the social welfare is always better-off in favor of the full information relative to the incomplete information, no matter informed or uninformed manufacturer and irrespective of the mode of ERP policy. For the case of the uninformed government, when the difference between two types of foreign market demand is large enough, the separating policy is always preferred to the pooling policy. When the difference between two types of foreign market demand becomes smaller, the pooling policy is more desirable than the separating policy if two market sizes are similar; otherwise, if the separating policy is more preferred to the pooling policy if the home market is completely big. For the case of uninformed government and uninformed manufacturer, the pooling policy is more desirable than the separating policy only if two countries are comparatively similar in size and the probability of high type is small enough, otherwise the separating policy is called-for.