研討日期	2021年7月19日上午10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	Managerial Delegation of Competing Vertical Chains with Vertical Externality
作者 Authors of the paper	Kangsik Choi, Ki-Dong Lee, Seonyoung Lim
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2020; 20190029
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、Beny Trias Oktora、彭正浩、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、丁虹仁、Suttiwan 蘇婷、林燕淑、賴宜君、張瑞雲、吳世傑、楊雅棠、羅先佑、陳彥勲
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers, assuming that the manufacturer sets the input price after observing the terms of the incentive contracts offered to management in the downstream market. Thus, we compare the two models: (1) decentralized bargaining between manufacturers and retailers including two-part tariff contract (2) linear input pricing without bargaining. Contrast to previous studies, we find that in equilibrium, the owners of retailers offer delegation contracts to managers for output restriction regardless of competition modes when offering linear input pricing, which implies that owners do not face a prisoners’ dilemma situation and Pareto superior profit is obtained for retailer. Thus, managerial delegation of retailer is not socially desirable due to the output restriction. Furthermore, decentralized bargaining allows to equalize all the equilibrium outcomes in the different delegation structure under both Bertrand and Cournot competition and leads no delegation for the endogenous delegation problem.