研討日期	2021年7月5日上午10:30~ 12:20
研討地點	國立臺灣大學Webex Meeting
主講題目 Title of the paper	Licensing a Quality-Enhancing Innovation to an Upstream Firm
作者 Authors of the paper	Xiaoli Tian
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Economic Modelling 53 (2016) 509–514
主講人	陳彥勲
參加人員	陳彥勲、Beny Trias Oktora、彭正浩、Dong Van Chung、黃鴻、丁虹仁、高國峯、施姵全、Suttiwan 蘇婷、梁文榮、林燕淑、賴宜君、張瑞雲、羅先佑、楊雅棠、王羿傑、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper examines the case where a patent holder who is not a producer licenses its quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm, which sells its product through a downstream monopoly. It is found that the patent holder prefers a two-part tariff contract, which includes both a fixed-fee and per-unit output royalty. However, the royalty included in the licensing contract makes each firm price at a markup over marginal cost and therefore makes both consumers and the society worse off, if the innovation is small and the supplier is weak. From a welfare perspective, licensing by means of an ad valorem tax is more efficient, as it allows the upstream firm to be less aggressive when trading with the downstream firm.