研討日期	2021年5月17日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts
作者 Authors of the paper	Linda Gratz and Markus Reisinger
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 429–437
主講人	Damiana Simanjuntak
參加人員	Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、張瑞雲、黃鴻、林燕淑、王羿傑、丁虹仁、施姵全、蘇婷、高國峯、Beny Trias Oktora、陳彥勲
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case, an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracts but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracts, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.