研討日期	2021年5月3日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Social efficiency of entry and the implications of two part tariff in a vertical structure
作者 Authors of the paper	Yen Ju Lin
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	林晏如
參加人員	林晏如、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、Damiana Simanjuntak、Dong Van Chung、Suwannaja Sultiwan、陳彥勲、林虢楙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We analyze a Cournot oligopoly downstream market that produces a homogeneous product and incorporates vertical relationships when outsourcing input production to an external supplier is a feasible option. We demonstrate that the free entry is socially excessive when there is in house input production providing a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations. However, our finding yields an important policy implication, given that entry regulations have often been imposed on industries, such a justification is not necessarily valid when the outsourcing occurs We show that t he incumbent can practice input outsourcing through the two part tariff as a tool to deter the entry of the entrants, leading socially insufficient as the external supplier is more efficient. Moreover, we also find that there is socially insufficient when the entry cost is sufficiently low Our result spotlights the two part tariff pricing can have crucial ramifications for the attainment of procompetitive welfare effect for free entry.