研討日期	2021年3月29日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Incentives for input foreclosure
作者 Authors of the paper	Roman Inderst and TommasoValletti
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	European Economic Review, 55 (2011) 820–831
主講人	Bui Dang Long
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、丁虹仁、陳彥勲、林虢楙、Suwannaja Sultiwan、Damiana Simanjuntak、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in a model of upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly sub-stitutable inputs. Our main motivation is a critical assessment of common assertions that draw inferences from pre-merger observable variables to post-merger incentives to foreclose. In particular, we find that, contrary to some commonly expressed views, high margins on the downstream and low margins on the upstream market are not good predictors for the incentives of a newly integrated firm to foreclose rivals. Besidesthis contributiontopolicy,ourmodelalsoextendsexistingresultsintheliteratureonvertical foreclosurethroughallowingfortheinteractionofproductdifferentiationonthe upstreamandonthedownstreammarket.