研討日期 |
2021年2月8日上午10:20~ 12:30 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學710討論室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
The Competitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of
Renegotiation Breakdown |
作者 Authors of the paper |
Dongyeol Lee |
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Review of Industrial Organization (2015) 47:25–50 |
主講人 |
Damiana Simanjuntak |
參加人員 |
Damiana Simanjuntak、梁文榮、張瑞雲、Bui Dang Long、賴宜君、林虢楙、呂文智、陳彥勲 |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
This paper analyzes the
seller’s incentive to write exclusive contracts with buyers (‘‘exclusive
dealing’’) and the welfare implications of such contracts in the presence of
renegotiation breakdown whereby exclusive dealing is able to affect both the
incumbent seller’s investment and a rival’s entry. The analysis shows that the
probability of renegotiation breakdown plays a central role in determining
the competitive effect of exclusive dealing. Exclusivity is likely to be
anticompetitive for intermediate levels of renegotiation breakdown risk,
while it is likely to be procompetitive for a very low breakdown risk under
linear pricing (and for a very high breakdown risk under two-part tariffs).
The result suggests that the competitive effect of exclusive dealing is
decided by the interaction between investment promotion and foreclosure, which
in turn depends on the probability of renegotiation breakdown and the pricing
scheme that sellers can choose. |