研討日期	2021年1月11日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare
作者 Authors of the paper	Yongmin Chen and David E. M. Sappington
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (May 2011): 194–220
主講人	Bui Dang Long
參加人員	Bui Dang Long、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、高國峯、Damiana Simanjuntak、陳彥勲、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton’s (1987) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development (R&D) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent’s R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant’s R&D, and can reduce the incumbent’s R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce welfare if the incumbent’s R&D ability is sufficiently limited, but can increase welfare if patent protection and the incumbent’s R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced.