研討日期	2021年1月4日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
作者 Authors of the paper	Shin Kishimoto
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Journal of Economics (2020) 129:173–193
主講人	陳彥勲
參加人員	陳彥勲、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、林虢楙、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This study considers licensing of a cost-reducing technology through bargaining between a technology-holding firm and its rival firm in a Cournot duopoly market. To consider the relative bargaining power of both firms, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is applied as our solution. Then, we specify the combinations of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty that are realized through bargaining, and examine the effect on social welfare of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power. The principal findings are as follows. Regardless of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power, pure royalty licensing is carried out, and social welfare is non-increasing in its bargaining power. In our model, licensing through a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is often assumed in the literature, is regarded as the case in which the technology-holding firm has full bargaining power. Thus, the result on social welfare implies that the take-it-or-leave-it offer licensing mechanism leads to the socially worst outcome.