研討日期	2020年6月8日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	EXCLUSIVE DEALING: INVESTMENT PROMOTION MAY FACILITATE INEFFICIENT FORECLOSURE
作者 Authors of the paper	CHIARA FUMAGALLI, MASSIMO MOTTA, THOMAS RØNDE
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 0022-1821 Volume LX December 2012 No. 4
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	王羿傑、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、周宗翰、許至乙、Bui Dang Long
摘要 Abstract of the paper	This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller’s investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.