研討日期	2020年6月1日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學609討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	On the First-mover Advantage in a Bargaining Vertically Related Market
作者 Authors of the paper	Yi-Chun Lai
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Working paper
主講人	賴宜君
參加人員	賴宜君、林燕淑、施姵全、黃鴻、Dong Van Chung、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The downstream firms prefer to bargain through decentralized rather than centralized bargaining process. In contrast, the profits of the upstream firm and the firm not engaged in bargaining are higher respectively under centralized bargaining. When all downstream firms act as Stackelberg, social welfare is higher under decentralized bargaining, however, when downstream firms compete in Cournot fashion, social welfare would be higher under centralized bargaining than decentralized bargaining, if the product substitutability is sufficient high.