研討日期	2020年4月27日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學609討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts
作者 Authors of the paper	Patrick DeGraba
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 516–526
主講人	DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK
參加人員	王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、張瑞雲、彭正浩、黃鴻、賴宜君、BUI DANG LONG、Dong Van Chung、、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、周宗翰、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.