研討日期	2020年3月9日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學609討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition
作者 Authors of the paper	Jose Miguel Abito, Julian Wright
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	International Journal of Industrial Organization 26 (2008) 227–246
主講人	BUI DANG LONG
參加人員	BUI DANG LONG、梁文榮、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、彭正浩、黃鴻、周宗翰、DAMIANA SIMANJUNTAK、LUSUNG MKANDAWIRE、Dong Van Chung、葛士剛、賴宜君、許至乙
摘要 Abstract of the paper	The existing literature on exclusive dealing is extended to take into account that buyers signing exclusive deals are typically competing firms that are differentiated from the perspective of their customers. We show, provided such downstream firms are not too differentiated or provided upstream firms can compete in two-part tariffs, exclusive dealing forecloses entry to a more efficient rival. An established upstream firm and competing downstream firms raise their joint profit by signing exclusive deals to protect the industry from upstream competition. Naked exclusion arises despite the Chicago School logic that buyers only sign contracts that make themselves (jointly) better off.