研討日期

20161231日上午10:20~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

主講題目

Interfirm Bundled Discounts As A Collusive Device

作者

JONG-HEE HAHN and SANG-HYUN KIM

文獻出處

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 64, Issue 2, June 2016

Pages 255–276

主講人

暳陵

參加人員

暳陵、張博涵、王光正、林燕淑、陳金盛、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂得成、ByeongHwa Choi、詹銘葦、陳怡妏、郭紫瑩

摘要

This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand-specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other’s market power without excluding rivals.