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研討日期 |
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研討地點 |
台大社會科學院710討論室 |
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主講題目 |
Antidumping Protection and
R&D Competition |
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作者 |
Xiwang Gao and Kaz
Miyagiwa |
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文獻出處 |
Canadian Journal of
Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique,
Vol. 38, No. 1 February |
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主講人 |
周冰瑤 |
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參加人員 |
陳怡妏、周冰瑤、王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、蔡明芳、呂得成、ByeonHwa Choi、張博涵、曹古駒、詹銘葦、林季萱、郭紫瑩 |
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摘要 |
In recent years antidumping protection has
spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets
R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect
worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of
reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first
choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single
government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases
investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both
governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D
than under free trade. |