研討日期	2016年11月19日上午10:20~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Should Good Patents Come in Small Packages? A Welfare Analysis of Intellectual Property Bundling
作者	Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz
文獻出處	International Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (2006) 931– 952
主講人	呂得成
參加人員	呂得成、丁虹仁、王光正、王羿傑、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、彭正浩、曹古駒、詹銘葦、郭紫瑩、林季萱
摘要	Intellectual property owners often hold the rights to several patents, each of which is essential to make or use a product. We compare the welfare properties of package licenses, under which a licensee pays the same fee regardless of the number of technologies licensed, with component licenses, under which each technology is licensed separately and there is no quantity discount. A central finding is that a long-term package license can induce incentives to invent around patents and invest in complementary assets that are closer to their socially optimal levels than are those induced by a long-term component license. We also identify settings in which a short-term license is a partial substitute for a package license and a prohibition on package licensing induces parties to adopt contracts that result in less efficient complementary investment because of hold-up.