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研討日期 |
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研討地點 |
台大社會科學院710討論室 |
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主講題目 |
Compulsory licensing, price
controls, and access to patented foreign products |
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作者 |
Eric W. Bond and Kamal Saggi |
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文獻出處 |
Journal of Development
Economics 109 (2014) 217–228 |
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主講人 |
張博涵 |
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參加人員 |
曹古駒、張博涵、王光正、林燕淑、施姵全、高國峯、梁文榮、黃鴻、ByeongHwa Choi、詹銘葦、陳怡妏、郭紫瑩 |
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摘要 |
We analyze how a price control and the threat of
compulsory licensing (CL) affect consumer access in a developing country
(South) to a patented foreign product. In the model, the Southern government
sets the level of the price control on a Northern patent-holder who chooses
between entry and voluntary licensing (VL). While entry incurs a higher fixed
cost, licensed production is of lower quality. If the patent-holder does not work
its patent locally, the South is free to use CL. The threat of CL: ensures
that consumers have access to (a lower quality version of) the patented good
when the patent-holder chooses not to work its patent locally; improves the
terms at which VL occurs; can cause the patent-holder to switch from VL to
entry; and can delay consumer access when CL replaces VL or entry. We also show
that a price control and CL are mutually reinforcing instruments. |