研討日期	2016年9月10日上午10:20~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Disclosure standards for vertical contracts
作者	Anil Arya and Brian Mittendorf
文獻出處	RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 42, No. 3, Fall 2011 pp. 595–617
主講人	施姵全
參加人員	施姵全、曹古駒、丁虹仁、王光正、林燕淑、高國峯、梁文榮、陳宏易、陳金盛、黃鴻、蔡明芳、鍾暳陵、ByeonHwa Choi、周冰瑤、郭紫螢
摘要	In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers’ perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, disclosure becomes a conduit through which suppliers compete indirectly via their retail surrogates. Consumers welcome the increased competition accompanying such disclosures. In short, the efficacy of disclosure standards depends critically on the suppliers’ market reach and the relative intensity of intrabrand versus interbrand retail competition.