研討日期	2016年8月6日上午12:00~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	BERTRAND VS. COURNOT COMPETITION WITH UPSTREAM FIRM INVESTMENT
作者	DongJoon Lee and Kangsik Choi
文獻出處	Bulletin of Economic Research 00:0, 2015, 0307-3378
主講人	張瑞雲
參加人員	曹古駒、林燕淑、張博涵、呂得成、高國峯、張瑞雲、陳宏易、鍾暳陵、黃鴻、林晏如、王光正、劉乙人
摘要	This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated.