研討日期

201679日上午12:00 ~ 13:10

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

主講題目

A Note on the Efficiency of Indirect Taxes in an Asymmetric  Cournot Oligopoly

作者

 Judy Hsu

文獻出處

Review of Economics & Finance

主講人

周冰瑤

參加人員

曹古駒、周冰瑤、林燕淑、張瑞雲、高國峯、黃鴻、鍾暳陵、陳金盛、林晏如、梁文榮、彭正浩、劉乙人

摘要

 Based on product homogeneity and Cournot competition, a recurrent finding in the literature is that ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to unit taxation in noncompetitive markets. This paper first observes that with asymmetric costs inefficient firms are more likely to be inactive in equilibrium under ad valorem taxation than under unit taxation. It is then illustrated that if the inefficient firms’ unit costs and/or the ad valorem tax rate are high enough then unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation.