研討日期	2016年7月9日上午10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Free entry and social inefficiency under co-opetition
作者	Keisuke Hattori · Takeshi Yoshikawa
文獻出處	J Econ (2016) 118:97–119
主講人	曹古駒
參加人員	曹古駒、周冰瑤、林燕淑、張瑞雲、高國峯、黃鴻、鍾暳陵、陳金盛、林晏如、梁文榮、彭正浩、劉乙人
摘要	We investigate the social desirability of free entry under co-opetition where firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect industry-wide demand. Our findings indicate that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient market entry, depending on the commitment of investment in common property resources. In the non-commitment case, where quantities and investment are simultaneously chosen, there is a possibility of insufficient entry. However, in the pre-commitment case, where investment is chosen at a prior stage, free entry leads to excess entry and a reduction in common property resources. Interestingly, in this case, the excess entry results of Mankiw and Whinston (RAND J Econ 17:48–58, 1986) hold even without entry costs or economies of scale. These results have important policy implications for entry regulation.