研討日期

2016618日上午10:20 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

主講題目

Bundling and Endogenous Product Differentiation

作者

暳陵、林燕淑

文獻出處

研討會論文

主講人

暳陵

參加人員

暳陵、王羿傑、曹古駒、林燕淑、施姵全、呂得成、張博涵、黃鴻、梁文榮、蔡明芳、陳金盛、高國峯、林晏如、陳宏易、周冰瑤、彭正浩

摘要

 

This paper follows the model setting of Martin (1999) and Lin and Saggi (2002) to construct a three-stage game model of two-firm, two-type products. We further takes into account product innovation competition in competing good market, in order to consider the bundling effects on product innovation, firms’ profit, consumer surplus, and welfare. We find that Bundling increases both firms’ product innovations when the degree of product differentiation of competing good is lower than an approximation of one-half. Instead, when the degree of substitutability of competing good is larger than the critical value the bundling still increase rival firm’s product innovation but decreases its own product innovation level. If the initial value of degree of product differentiation is greater than 0.5, then bundling is the dominant strategy for firm A. When both firms engage product innovation competition, bundling may increase the

rival’s profit and welfare, and increases consumer surplus.