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研討日期 |
2016年6月18日上午10:20 ~ 12:00 |
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研討地點 |
台大社會科學院710討論室 |
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主講題目 |
Bundling
and Endogenous Product Differentiation |
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作者 |
鍾暳陵、林燕淑 |
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文獻出處 |
研討會論文 |
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主講人 |
鍾暳陵 |
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參加人員 |
鍾暳陵、王羿傑、曹古駒、林燕淑、施姵全、呂得成、張博涵、黃鴻、梁文榮、蔡明芳、陳金盛、高國峯、林晏如、陳宏易、周冰瑤、彭正浩 |
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摘要 |
This paper follows the
model setting of Martin (1999) and Lin and Saggi (2002) to construct a
three-stage game model of two-firm, two-type products. We further takes into account product innovation competition in
competing good market, in order to consider the bundling effects on product
innovation, firms’ profit, consumer surplus, and welfare. We find that Bundling
increases both firms’ product innovations when the degree of product
differentiation of competing good is lower than an
approximation of one-half. Instead, when the degree of substitutability of
competing good is larger than the critical value the
bundling still increase rival firm’s product innovation but decreases its own
product innovation level. If the initial value of degree of product
differentiation is greater than 0.5, then bundling is the dominant strategy
for firm A. When both firms engage product innovation competition, bundling
may increase the rival’s profit and welfare, and increases consumer surplus. |