研討日期	2016年5月21日上午10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Endogenous Choice of Subsidy Instruments in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Unit Subsidy versus an Ad Valorem Subsidy
作者	Nobuo AKAI, Hikaru OGAWA, and Yoshitomo OGAWA
文獻出處	Annals of Economics and Statistics
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、張瑞雲、曹古駒、施姵全、林燕淑、林晏如、呂得成、梁文榮、黃鴻、彭正浩、陳金盛、高國峯、王光正、陳宏易、王羿傑
摘要	This paper analyzes the endogenous choice problem of subsidy instruments as production expansion (export-promotion) policies. We consider a two-region economy in which firms produce a homogeneous good and sell it in a third region. The government in each region provides a production subsidy to the domestic firm in either a unit or an ad valorem form. Our main result is that selection of a unit subsidy is the dominant strategy for each region and it is welfare superior to an ad valorem subsidy, which offers a justification for the unit subsidy assumption made in the existing literature. We explain the intuition behind this result using the properties of the best responses. JEL: H21, H25, H71, F12. / KEY WORDS: Subsidy, Unit, Ad Valorem.