研討日期	2016年4月23日上午10:20 ~ 13:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms
作者	Luca Lambertini
文獻出處	Papers in Regional Science (2001)
主講人	王羿傑
參加人員	周冰瑤、王羿傑、施姵全、林燕淑、張博涵、黃鴻、呂得成、梁文榮、鍾暳陵、陳金盛、彭正浩、高國峯、王光正、丁虹仁、曹古駒
摘要	The nature of the equilibria arising under spatial differentiation is investigated here in a duopoly model, where at least one firm maximises value added per worker. The study shows that if firms’ objectives differ, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, which is possibly characterized by asymmetric locations. If both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Otherwise, undercutting is profitable.