研討日期

2016423日上午10:20 ~ 13:10

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

主講題目

Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms

作者

Luca Lambertini

文獻出處

Papers in Regional Science (2001)

主講人

王羿傑

參加人員

周冰瑤、王羿傑、施全、林燕淑、張博涵、黃鴻、呂得成、梁文榮、暳陵、陳金盛、彭正浩、高國峯、王光正、丁虹仁、曹古駒

摘要

The nature of the equilibria arising under spatial differentiation is investigated here in a duopoly model, where at least one firm maximises value added per worker. The study shows that if firms’ objectives differ, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, which is possibly characterized by asymmetric locations. If both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Otherwise, undercutting is profitable.