研討日期 |
2016年4月9日上午10:20 ~ 13:10 |
研討地點 |
台大社會科學院710討論室 |
主講題目 |
Strategic Decisions of a
Multi-product Firm under Bertrand Competition |
作者 |
Hui-Ling Chung, Hung-Yi Chen, Yan-Shu Lin |
文獻出處 |
Working
paper (2016) |
主講人 |
鍾暳陵 |
參加人員 |
鍾暳陵、丁虹仁、曹古駒、施姵全、林燕淑、呂得成、張瑞雲、 |
摘要 |
When
facing a single-product entrant in one of its two differentiated good
markets, a multi-product firm may respond by choosing among the three
strategies: (i) continue to operate at the status quo with keen price competition with the entrant, (ii) exit the
competing-good market and concentrate on selling its monopoly good, and (iii)
bundle the two differentiated goods
and only sell the bundled package. We show
that if two goods are substitutes, both strategies of
bundling and exiting the second-good market for the multi-product firm are
better than those of the status quo. Nevertheless, if two goods are
complements, the status quo and bundling two
goods as a bundle are better than exiting the market. We
further compare whether the multi-product firm finds it a profitable
strategy to exit the competing-good market or to bundle the products as a
package depends crucially on the substitutability or complementarity between
the two products. In terms of
welfare, we find that product bundling yields welfare superior to the other two strategies, regardless
of whether the two products are substitutes or complements. |