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研討日期 |
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研討地點 |
台大社會科學院814討論室 |
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主講題目 |
Price and Quantity Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with a
Socially Concerned Firm |
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作者 |
Michael Kopel |
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文獻出處 |
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS |
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主講人 |
張瑞雲 |
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參加人員 |
曹古駒、張瑞雲、張博涵、施姵全、高國峯、黃鴻、陳金盛、梁文榮、林晏如、林燕淑、王羿傑、王光正、彭正浩 |
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摘要 |
I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity
contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm, which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Equilibria
with price and quantity contracts might co-exist; welfare under price
competition might be lower than under quantity competition; the firms’ profit ranking
might be different from that of a private duopoly or mixed duopoly with a
public firm. Hence,
if a firm follows
a social strategy, the optimal market strategy crucially depends on the
levels of social concern and competition in the market. The presence of
socially concerned firms may
change the mode of competition. |