研討日期

2016220日上午10:20 ~ 13:10

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論

主講題目

Optimal Trade Policy, Corporate Control, and Foreign Ownership in Oligopoly

作者

KU-CHU TSAO

文獻出處

Working Paper

主講人

KU-CHU TSAO

參加人員

曹古駒、丁虹仁、林燕淑、呂得成、施全、梁文榮、林晏如、高國峯、王光正、周冰瑤、彭正浩

摘要

This paper constructs a two-country with multi-firms to explore the unilateral optimal trade policy under Cournot competition when the domestic multinational firms undertake foreign ownership investments. The study finds that the optimal trade policy of the domestic country could be tax when the multinational firm has foreign firm’s full corporate control. This result arises because an export subsidy could enlarge the outputs of the foreign independent firm and that reduces the incentive to subsidy the exportation. Moreover, a higher ratio of foreign ownership will cause a lower rate of export tariff. Without having corporate control, the optimal trade policy could be a subsidy when the number of multinational firms is small or the degree of product substitutability is large. However, a higher foreign ownership ratio of the multinational firms lower the optimal rate of a subsidy if the two goods are more substituted.