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摘要
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This paper constructs a
two-country with multi-firms to explore the unilateral optimal trade policy
under Cournot competition when the domestic
multinational firms undertake foreign ownership investments. The study finds
that the optimal trade policy of the domestic country could be tax when the
multinational firm has foreign firm’s full corporate control. This result
arises because an export subsidy could enlarge the
outputs of the foreign independent firm and that reduces the incentive to subsidy
the exportation. Moreover, a higher ratio of foreign ownership will cause a lower
rate of export tariff. Without having corporate control, the optimal trade
policy could be a subsidy when the number of multinational firms is small or
the degree of product substitutability is large. However, a
higher foreign ownership ratio of the multinational firms lower the
optimal rate of a subsidy if the two goods are more substituted.
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