研討日期	2016年1月30日上午10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs
作者	PIERCARLO ZANCHETTIN
文獻出處	Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 15( 4), 2006, p.999–1015
主講人	周冰瑤
參加人員	周冰瑤、鍾暳陵、曹古駒、劉乙人、林燕淑、陳金盛、陳宏易、梁文榮、王光正、丁虹仁
摘要	In this paper, we compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions. We extend the Singh and Vives (1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that both the efficient firm’s profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore, Singh and Vives’s ranking of profits between the two modes of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, we also show that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm’s and industry profits, implying that a local incentive towards less differentiation may arise.