研討日期

2016123日上午10:20 ~ 13:10

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論

主講題目

Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly

 

作者

George Symeonidis

 

文獻出處

IJIO(2010)

主講人

施姵全

參加人員

林晏如、施姵全、曹古駒、林燕淑、蔡明芳、呂得成、蔡朝宇、劉明哲、梁文榮、周冰瑤、王羿傑

摘要

The author analyses the effects of a downstream merger in a differentiated oligopoly when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). Bargaining outcomes can be observable or unobservable by rivals. When competition is in quantities, upstream agents are independent and bargaining is over a uniform input price, a merger between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. However, when competition is in prices or the upstream agents are not independent or bargaining is over a two-part tariff or bargaining covers both the input price and the level of output, the standard welfare results are restored: a downstream merger always reduces consumer surplus and overall welfare.