研討日期	2016年1月16日上午10:20 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
主講題目	Antidumping Protection and R&D Competition
作者	Xiwang Gao and Kaz Miyagiwa
文獻出處	The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 38, No. 1(Feb., 2005), pp. 211-227
主講人	胡家瑜
參加人員	彭正浩、胡家瑜、施姵全、林燕淑、鄭依涵、梁文榮、陳金盛、高國峯、王光正、張瑞雲、呂得成、黃鴻、薛宜珊
摘要	In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade.