研討日期

2014年12月27日10:30 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

題目

Entry-License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot

作者

Susumu Cato and Toshihiro Matsumura

文獻出處

Working paper

報告人

Susumu Cato

參加人員

Junichiro Ishida、Susumu Cato、黃鴻、林燕淑、彭正浩、陳金盛、丁虹仁、吳尚弈、呂雅媛、曹古駒、施姵全

摘要

This study investigates how leadership affects public policies in markets where the number of firms is endogenously determined.   We focus on the relationship between the relative efficiency of an incumbent firm and the optimal entry tax (entry barrier). We find that this relationship depends on whether the incumbent can commit to the output before the entries of new firms. The optimal entry tax is decreasing (res. increasing) in the productivity of the incumbent when it takes (res. does not take) leadership. We also find that the optimal entry barrier occurring when the incumbent takes leadership is lower than that when it does not.