研討日期

2014年12月27日10:30 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

題目

A Tenure-Clock Problem

作者

Chia-Hui Chen and Junichiro Ishida

文獻出處

Working paper

報告人

Junichiro Ishida

參加人員

Junichiro Ishida、Susumu Cato、黃鴻、林燕淑、彭正浩、陳金盛、丁虹仁、吳尚弈、呂雅媛、曹古駒、施姵全

摘要

We consider a “tenure-clock problem” in which a principal may set a deadline by which she needs to evaluate an agent’s ability and decides whether to promote him or not. We embed this problem in a continuous-time model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to facilitate her learning process. The value of committing to a deadline is examined in this environment, and factors that make the deadline more profitable are identified. Our simple framework allows us to obtain a complete characterization of the equilibrium, both with and without commitment, and provides insight into why up-or-out contracts are prevalent in some industries while they are almost non-existent in others.