研討日期	2014年11月29日上午10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710教室
題目	Anti-dumping Retaliations
作者	Kuo-Feng Kao and Chin-Sheng Chen
文獻出處	Working Paper
報告人	高國峯
參加人員	梁文榮、陳宏易、林燕淑、王光正、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、蔡明芳、呂得成、周冰瑤、呂雅媛、施姵全
摘要	This paper aims to explain two important phenomenons, that is, why anti-dumping retaliation occurs and whether anti-dumping retaliation makes anti-dumping protection more likely or less likely to happen? It is found that an anti-dumping policy itself may result in another dumping, and thus another anti-dumping policy. Moreover, we show that even if there is dumping margin in one country while the other is not, firms suffered from dumping may not have the incentives to petition for an anti-dumping protection. Finally, retaliatory anti-dumping policy lowers the incentives of firms to petition for an anti-dumping protection.