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MERGER INCENTIVES AND
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE |
JAN BOUCKAERT and PETER M. KORT |
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 436-466,
2014 |
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The merger incentives
between profitable firms differ fundamentally from the incentives of a
profitable firm to merge with a failing firm. We investigate these incentives
under different modes of price competition and Cournot
behavior. Our main finding is that firms strictly prefer exit of the failing
firm to acquisition. This result may imply that other than strategic reasons,
like economies of scale, must be looked for to understand why firms make use
of the failing firm defense. However, when products are sufficiently heterogenous, we find that (i)
the failing firm defense can be welfare enhancing and (ii) a government
bail-out increases total welfare when the number of firms is sufficiently
low. |
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