研討日期

20141115  10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   710討論室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

MERGER INCENTIVES AND THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE

JAN BOUCKAERT and

PETER M. KORT

JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 436-466, 2014

報告人

蔡明芳

參加人員

林晏如、彭正浩、蔡明芳、涂光億、高國峯、陳金盛、吳尚弈、呂雅媛、曹古駒、呂得成、施姵全

討論提要

The merger incentives between profitable firms differ fundamentally from the incentives of a profitable firm to merge with a failing firm. We investigate these incentives under different modes of price competition and Cournot behavior. Our main finding is that firms strictly prefer exit of the failing firm to acquisition. This result may imply that other than strategic reasons, like economies of scale, must be looked for to understand why firms make use of the failing firm defense. However, when products are sufficiently heterogenous, we find that (i) the failing firm defense can be welfare enhancing and (ii) a government bail-out increases total welfare when the number of firms is sufficiently low.

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