研討日期	2014年11月8日10:30 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
題目	Bargaining Power, Subcontracting and Strategic Trade Policy
作者	Ku-Chu Tsao
文獻出處	Working paper
報告人	曹古駒
參加人員	黃鴻、梁文榮、林晏如、彭正浩、蔡明芳、高國峯、陳金盛、曹古駒、呂得成、呂雅媛
摘要	In our model, we investigate how strategic trade policy is affected by bargaining power under the subcontracting. Our finding is that the price of the final good of domestic firm is decreasing(increasing) after subcontracting if domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small(large), but the foreign firm’s is always decreasing. Then, generally speaking, in order to improve the profit transfer effect, government would impose the export tax on the intermediate good. In this paper, however, we have found that the above situation only occurs on the domestic bargaining power is sufficiently small, but the export subsidy if the bargaining power is sufficiently large. In addition, we also demonstrate that a higher domestic bargaining power increases domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous. On the other hand, if the export policy is endogenous, a higher domestic bargaining power decreases domestic profit when the tax effect is negative and shall be large enough. Finally, we have extended the analytic model to a situation which is that foreign firm has an outside option to subcontract the intermediate good to another country. We argue that, if the domestic bargaining power is sufficiently large, the outside option does not threaten the domestic optimal export policy. But, if the domestic bargaining power is sufficiently small, the outside option does threaten the domestic optimal export policy, and a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. Meanwhile, foreign firm may still subcontract to domestic firm even if domestic firm have a higher total cost of intermediate good than the outside option.